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7

NATURE OF CASE

This is a judicial review of the Decision of the Board
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying unemployment compensation benefits to approximately 1,300
claimants for the period of April 1, 1979, through April 14,
1979.

DISPOSITION OF BOARD OF REVIEW

By a 2-1 vote the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission denied unemployment compensation to all categories
of the approximate 1,300 claimants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Petitioners seek to reverse the devision of the Board of
Review to allow unemployment compensation benefits to all
categories of claimants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Petitioners are approximately 1,300 claimants who are
represented in Utah by the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers
of America, Locals 222 and 976.

The claimants are employees

of Interstate Motor Lines ("IML"), Consolidated Freightways
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

("CF"), Garrett Freightlines
("Garrett"),
Illinois-California
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

-2Express, Inc. ("ICX"), and Pacific Intermountain Express
("PIE"). (R. 000111 to 00024).

These employers, with East

Texas Motor Freight ("ETMF"), Rio Grande Motorway ("RG"),
and Sundance Transportation, Inc. ("Sundance"), are represente:
in Utah by the Intermountain Operators League, an employer's

union.
For a number of years the Teamsters and the Intermountain
Operators League have been parties in their respective
representative capacities to a collective bargaining agreement
called the 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement.
(R.00027). This national agreement generally regulates the
terms and conditions of all phases of employment between the
employers signatory to the agreement and their respective
employees. The 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement
expired by its own terms at midnight, March 31, 1979.
On December 11, 1978, in accordance with the provisions
of the 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement, the
Teamsters notified the Intermountain Operators League that
it desired to revise or change certain terms and conditions
of the National Master Freight Agreement effective April 1,
1979.

(R.00027 and R.00068). Then, Teamsters Locals 222 and

976, as well as other teamsters locals in the United States
authorized the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-3Washington, D.C., to act as their collective bargaining
agent (R.00027). Likewise, the Intermountain Operators
League consisting of the employers here involved, and approximately
11,000 other trucking firms in the United States, authorized
Trucking Management, Inc. ("TMI") to act as their collective
bargaining agent. (R.00063 to R.00067).
Collective bargaining proceedings between IBT and TMI
for a new 1979-1982 National Master Freight Agreement began
on January 23, 1979, in Washington, D.C. (R.00027).

One

purpose the IBT engaged in early collective bargaining
proceedings was to avoid a strike or lockout.

(T.00141)

The United States Government through the President's economic
advisor Alfred Kahn, Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, and the Interstate C0tmnerce Commission, actively
particpated in the collective bargaining proceedings.
(T.00141)

According to the testimony of Grant Scott Haslam,

who participated in the collective bargaining proceedings,
the United States Government threatened deregulation and
denial of rate increases unless IBT acceded to TMI's economic
demands. (T.00142). Frank Fitzsimmons, told a press conference
on April 2, 1979, that Alfred Kahn and Barry Bosworth of the
Council of Wage and Price Stability "played a major role in
causing our strike." R.00076)

As March 31, 1979, approached,

the IBT determined that TMI was negotiating in bad faith and
had no intention of reaching an agreement by or on March 31,
1979

(R.00101).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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For example, TMI proposed during the late evening hours
on March 31, an economic counter proposal that failed to
even provide employees an opportunity to recoup losses
suffered by inflation and that failed to allow owner operators
cost increases to recover the costs of operating their own
equipment. (R.00102).
The IBT believed that TMI was forcing and precipitating
a national strike.

(R.00102)

The IBT further believed that

TMI desired a national strike because such would cause
President Carter to invoke a Taft-Hartley injunction, which
would end the strike for the statutory 80 days and maintain
the lower 1976-1979 agreement rates.

(Ibid).

Therefore, in the early morning hourse of April 1,
1979, the IBT called a "selective strike" against a few
employers and not a national strike.

(T.00147).

This is

the first occasion where a selective strike had been called
by the IBT in its history.
trucking firms were struck.

(T.00149)
(T.00147)

Only 73 out of 11,000
Nothwithstanding

this selective strike, the IBT remained willing to continue
collective bargaining. (R.00071)

In addition, the IBT

offered "interim agreements" to all employers represented by
TMI (T.00145).
Despite IBT's efforts to limit the effect of the strike,
TMI decided at 1:00 P.M. on April 1, 1979, to engage in an
industry-wide national lockout of employees (R.00077, R.00059
and T.00147), and threatened legal action if IBT pursued
i
interim agreements with individual trucking concerns. (R. 00060 1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-5The selective strike, national lockout, and interim
agreement and TMI's threat will be discussed in more detail.
Selective Strike.
were struck.

Only 73 out of 11,000 trucking firms

The 73 employers struck were determined by

IBT (R.00123).

In Utah, CF, Garrett, ICX and PIE were

struck. (R.00172). IML was not struck, nationally or in
Utah. (T.00144). Approximately 600 of the claimants were
employed by IML.(R.00013 to 00018).

The IBT issued strict

instructions governing the selective strike. (R. 00126).

One

instruction was not to interupt the operations of any employer
not struck.

CF, Garrett and PIE were struck in Utah by

normal peaceful strike activities in the early morning on
April 1, 1979. (T.00136). ICX was struck on April 2, 1979.
(T.00146).
National Lockout.

As stated supra, TMI ordered an

industry-wide national lockout of all enployees at 1: 00 P .M.
on April 1, 1979, from Washington, D.C.

In Utah, IML, who

was not struck, locked out its 600 employees at 1:00 P.M.
on April 1, 1979, in accordance with TMI's order. (T.00167).
IML innnediately notified its employees not to report to work.
(Ibid.)

CF also locked out its employees and instructed

its people not to come to work. (T.00164). RD, UP and Sundance
did not lock out their employees. (T.00147). The Petitioners
had no control over the decision to lock out or the lock
out itself. (T.00149).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Interim Agreement and Threat.

As described supra, the

IBT offered all employers under the National Master Freight
Agreement, including those struck, "interim agreements."
The interim agreement is set forth in full at R.00105.
The purpose of the interim agreements was to allow employers
to continue operations during the strike.

If signed the

individual employer would not be struck and all strike
would cease.

activit~

(T.00145). The interim agreement would terminate

and be superceded upon an agreement between TMI and IBT
on the terms of the National Master Freight Agreement. (R.001Li
This allowed employees to work while negotiations continued.
No employer in Utah signed the interim agreement. (T.00145).
However, hundreds

of trucking firms did sign the interim

agreement (R.0078 to 00100), allowing their employees to
continue working.

In return, TMI threatened the IBT with

legal action if the IBT continued with its attempts to soften
the effects of the strike by offering interim agreements.
(R.00061).
The differences between TMI and IBT were settled on
April 11, 1979, and all strike activity by the Teamsters
ceased.

However, work did not resume until April 14, 1979,

because of strike activity in progress by the International
Association of Machinists, Automotive Lodge 1020. (R.00028).
The IBT or Locals 976 and 222 had no control over this strike
activity of the Machinists. (T.00156).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT ONE
THE RESPONDENTS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CONDUCT
OF LABOR WAS THE REAL AND FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF
THE WORK STOPPAGE RESULTING IN DENIAL OF
BENEFITS TO ALL CLAIMANTS
The statute governing an award of unemployment compensation
benefits is Section 35-4-5(d) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
An individual shall be inelegible for benefits
(d) For any week in which it is found by the
commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage
of work which exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or
establishment at which he is or was last employed.
(1) If the commission, upon investigation shall
find that a strike has been fomented by a worker of
any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class
or group of workers of the individual who is found
to be a party to such plan, or agreement to foment a
strike, shall be eligible for benefits ... "
This statute has been interpreted principally by three Utah
Supreme Court opinions:

Olof Nelson Construction Co. v.

Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243

P. 2d 951 (1952);

Teamsters, Chauffers, and Helpers of America, Locals 222
and 976 of International Brotherhood v. Orange Transportation
Co., et al., 5 Utah 2d 45, 296 R2d 291 (1956); and Teamsters
etc. v. Board of Review, etc., 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 E2d 558
(1960).

The latter two were decided principally upon the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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authority of Olof Nelson case

which is clearly the seminal

opinion.

Generally

these opinions interpret the statute

broadly.

They define the relevant group or class of workers

by the bargaining unit of which the employee or employer is
a member, and apply a "volitional test" which disqualifies a
worker from benefits if his bargaining unit is principally
responsible for the work stoppage involved.
Teamsters etc. v. Board of Review,

As stated in

supra 348 P.2d at 563;

"In a controversy of this character, the critical issue is
whether the conduct of labor or of management is the real
and fundamental cause of the work stoppage."
The Respondents denied benefits to all categories of
claimants in the instant action.

The denial was based upon

ten Findings of Fact made by the Appeal Referee (R.00028)
which were adopted without qualification by the Board of
Review. (R.00007).

There is no factual finding by the

Respondents concerning who was the real and fundamental
cause of the work stoppage.

The Respondents did, however,

make a legal conclusion, based upon the Olof Nelson and Orange
Transportation cases that labor was the volitional cause
of the work stoppage.

(R.00030, 00031).

The petitioners assert that the real and fundamental
factual cause of the work stoppage and resulting unemployment
for all claimants was the conduct of management and the
government, not labor.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-9The intent of the I.B.T. was to avoid any cessation of
work.

Negotiations for the new 1979-1982 National Master

Freight Agreement commenced nearly three months prior to
the expiration of the old contract.

One purpose of early

negotiations was to avoid a strike or a lockout. (T.00141).
Also,the I.B.T. called a selective strike rather than a
national industry wide strike. (T.00147).

Moreover, the

I. B. T. offered "interim agreements" to all employers

represented by T.M.I, who desired to continue operations.
(T.00145).

While no employer in this case signed the interim

agreement, hundreds of trucking firms did sign and continued
operations. (R.00061).

One purpose of this interim agreement

was to avoid a work cessation. (T.00145).

There was no intent

of the I.B.T. to strike prior to the late evening hours of
March 31, 1979. (T.00148).

Accordingly, it should be clear

that the intent of the I.B.T. was to avoid any work cessation.
The cause of the selective strike is clear.

The Petitioners

were the sole party producing any evidence on this issue.
The cause of the selective strike was the bad faith bargaining
by T.M.I

(in violation of 29USC 158d)

and government

interference in the collective bargaining processes.
According to the Affidavit of Robert Babtiste, attorney for
the I.B.T. and negotiator, which was admitted into evidence:
"3. The union negotiators were forced to call.
a strike during the early morning hours of April
1, 1979, against only 73 employers out of.the
approximately 11,000 employers who were signatory

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to this Agreement. The Union Negotiating
Committee also directed all of our members
employed by carriers not selected for s~r~ke
action to continue to work and not participate
in any strike activity. To the best of our
knowledge, our members complied with these
instructions and continued to work.
4. It was obvious to the union negotiators
and the undersigned that the industry was bargaining in bad faith and had no intention of reaching
an agreement on March 31 in order to avoid a
strike. The industry negotiators presented to the
union negotiators at the last possible moment during
the late evening hours of March 31, an economic counter-proposal that failed to allow our members to
recoup their losses suffered during the inflationary
spiral since their last increase which occurred one
year before, a refusal to agree to proposals to
improve safety on the job and a refusal to agree to
increase the economic situation of the owneroperators to a point to which they could at least
recover the cost of operating their equipment ..
5. It was obvious to the union negotiators
that the industry negotiators were attempting by
their obviously inadequate counter-proposal to
precipitate a strike by the unions. They assumed
that such a strike would be nation-wide in scope,
as it was in 1976 at the expiration of the prior
Agreement. In the event of a nation-wide strike,
the industry negotiators assumed, based upon
President Carter's earlier statements to this effect,
that the federal government would immediately seek
and secure a Taft-Hartley injunction ending the
strike for the statutorily prescribed 80 days.
However, the federal government did not move to
enjoin our limited, selective strike.
6. During the afternoon of April 1, the Executive Committee of Trucking Management, Inc., the
main bargaining association for the industry, met and
voted to lock out all of our members. The association
took this action in order to precipitate a nationwide stoppage of truck transportation which would
create a crisis situation that would force the federal government to seek a Taft-Hartley injunction
to restore trucking services to the nation. Another

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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major trucking industry association
(Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council)
refused to join in this lockout of our
members. Fortunately, the federal government correctly assessed the motive behind
the lockout and deferred its decision to seek
a Taft-Hartley injunction." (R.00101 to
(R.00103).

Mr. Babtiste's testimony is confirmed by the press conference
verbatim report by Frank E. Fitzsimmons dated April 2, 1979,
(R.00076).

Mr. Fitzsimmons, commenting on the right to

free collective bargaining under the Wagner Act, stated at
this press conference, "Alfred Kahn and Barry Bosworth of
the Council on Wage and Price Stability have totally disrupted
these negotiations and it can be fairly said that they played
a major role in causing our strike."

(Ibid).

In these

negotiations of course, management and government asserted
that labor abide by President Carter's Voluntary Wage and
Price Guidelines of 7%. (R.00059).

Labor was unwilling, in

light of the reports on corporate profits and a 13.4%
annual inflation rate.
The Respondents produced no evidence on the cause of
the selective strike.

There is no evidence that the selective

strike was a strike against all employers.

In fact, the

interim agreements offered by the I.B.T. is inconsistent
with that concept.
As a result of the I.B.T. 's calling of a selective
strike, Teamster Locals 222 and 976 struck P.I.E, Garrett
and C.F. in Utah on April 1.

C.F., as discussed~.
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also engaged in a lockout.

On April 2, 1979, Teamster Locals

222 and 976 struck I.C.X. and E.T.M.F.

I.M.L. was not

struck.
The employer union, represented by T.M.I,, retaliated
strongly.

At 1:00 P.M. on April 1, 1979, T.M.I. instructed

all employers to shut down their operations and lock out
its employees.

(R.00077, R.00059, and T.00147).

This was

not a selective lockout which could have occurred; rather
it was an unwarranted escalation of work cessation by calling '
for a national industry-wide lockout.

Further, T.M.I.

threatened legal action if I.B.T. pursued interim agreements
with employers.

(R.00060).

The Appeal Referee, in Finding

No. 9, specifically found that I.M.L. ceased its operations
in response to directives from T.M.I.

So did C.F.,

although C.F. had been struck earlier.
In conclusion on this point, the facts are clear that
the real and fundamental cause of the selective strike and
lockout was management and goverrnnent.

All categories of

of claimants should be awarded unemployment compensation
benefits.

POINT TWO
THE RESPONDENTS ERRED BY DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO THOSE EMPLOYEES LOCKED
OUT BY THEIR EMPLOYERS AND ESPECIALLY
THOSE LOCKED OUT BY I.M.L.
As set forth supra, T.M.I. strongly reacted to I.B.T. 's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agreements and ordered a national industry-wide lockout.
The Petitioners assert that the calling for a national
lockout, rather than a selective lockout, was an unwarranted
escalation of economic warfare resulting in the cessation
of work for thousands of employees nationwide.

In Utah

both I.M.L. and C.F. locked out their employees.

I.M.L.

shut out approximately 600 employees immediately by calling
them personally by telephone and instructing them not to
report to work.

(T.00167).

C.F. also called its employees

and told them not to report to work. (T.00164).

There are

approximately 600 I.M.L. claimants and 400 C.F. claimants
in this proceeding.
I.M.L. was not struck.

C.F. was struck on April l,

but hours later management locked out its employees.
As to those two categories of claimants, and especially
the I.M.L. claimants, the real and fundamental cause of
their cessation of work was management, not labor.

Olof

Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra;
and Teamsters v. Board of Review, supra.
The actions of T.M.I. in engaging in an industry-wide
lockout, rather than a selective lockout, constituted an
unwarranted escalation of economic warfare - - - the responsibility
of which cannot be placed upon the I.M.L. claimants by
denying unemployment compensation benefits.

The cause of

these claimants unemployment was T.M.I. 's decision to lockout.
The responsibi:ity for the cessation of work must rest with
management.

Many employees, such as R.G., U.P. and Sundance

by the S.J.out
Quinney Law
Library. Funding
for digitization provided (T.00147).
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
refused Sponsored
to lock
their
employees.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT THREE
THE RESPONDENTS VIOLATED PETITIONERS EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
IN DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS
The Petitioners respectfully submit that the disqualification provisions of Section 35-4-5(d) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, and the particular "volitional test" employed by
the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Utah and
United States Constitutions.

The Appeal Referee and the

Board of Review declined to address the constitutional issues
raised by the Petitioners.

(R.00026 and R.00007).

These

issues were reserved as " . . . a matter for the courts to
decide." (R.00030).
The type of hearing required by the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United States
Constitutions must be "meaningful," Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L.Ed. 2d 62, 66 85 S.Ct. 1187 (1965),
and "appropriate to the nature of the case."

Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed
865, 70S.Ct. 652 (1950).

I

Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment!

requires there be some rational basis for any presumptions
concerning qualification or disqualification for unemployment
benefits.
U.2d

Turner v. Department of Empilioyment Security

, 531 P.2d 870,

~·

96 S.Ct. 249, 423 U.S. 44,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

-15-

46 L.Ed. 2d 181, 184 (1975).

Lastly, the Equal Protection

Clause does not allow statutory differentation of classes
based on criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251,

30 L.Ed. 2d 225 (1971).

"A classification must be reasonable

not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."

(Ibid.)

The objectives of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S.
Section 503(a)(l) and Utah's corresponding Utah Employment
Security Act. 35-4-1 et. seq.
must accordingly be considered.

U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
In respect to the Social

Security Act, "The objective of Congress was to provide a
substitute for wages lost during a period of unemployment
not the fault of the employee."

California Human Resources

Dept. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130, 28 L.Ed 2d. 666, 91 S.Ct.
1347 (1971).

The objectives of Utah's Act is also unambiguous.

"It is clear from this language that the primary purpose
of such an act is to provide protection for employees; it
is not the direct or primary purpose of such legislation
to control or regulate the relationship of employer and employee."
Abramsen v. Board of Review, 3 U.2d 389, 284 P.2d 213, 216
(1955).

"Its purpose is remedial to protect the health,

morals and welfare of the people by providing a cushion against
the shocks and rigors of unemployment."

Singer Sewing
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Machine Co. v.Industrial Commission, 104 U. 175, 134 P.2d
479, 485 (1943).
The public policy of the State of Utah vis-a-vis labor
is also important to consider.

Illustrative of this policy

is Section 34-20-1 U.C.A. (1953), as amended.

In pertinent

part, this section provides:

"
(1) It recognizes that there are three major
interests involved, namely: that of the public,
the employee, and the employer. These three
interests are to a considerable extent interrelated.
It is the policy of the state to protect and promote
each of these interests with due regard to the situation and to the rights of the others.
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate
income for employee, and uninterrupted production
of goods and services are promotive of all of
these interests . . . .
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions
of work should result from voluntary agreement
between employer and employee. . . . "
The decisions of the Appeal Referee and the Board of
Review violated the abov.e constitutional principles and
statutory objectives in a number of direct and indirect
ways.
First, the Respondents based their decision to deny
benefits on an improper conclusion or presumption by using
the volitional test.

By doing so, benefits were denied

to employees out of work through no fault of their own.
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-17It should be noted that the volitional test is a judicial
invention expoused in the Olof Nelson case and not found in
Utah's disqualification statute, Section 35-4-S(d).
are several factors for this creation.

There

One was that the

Court in Olof Nelson confronted multi-employer-union disputes
for the first time.

Also, Utah's disqualification statute

does not provide for eligibility during a lockout; yet,
benefits should be provided when the unemployment is not
the fault of the employee.

The Court in Olof Nelson then

discarded any geographical criteria (as called for distinctly
by the Statute) and focused on "involvement."

The Court

then adopted the volitional test to determine qualification:
responsibility for the work stoppage is allocated to the
party who created its actual and directly impelling cause.
Utah Courts have continued this test until today.
In the Olof Nelson case, the A.F. of L. was bargaining
on behalf of member craft unions with the Association of
General Contractors (A.G.C.) when a deadlock in negotiations
occurred and the A.F. of L. selectively struck two of the
A.G.C. employers, and the entire membership of the A.G.C.
responded by shutting down all projects.

The Industrial

Connnission initially granted an award of benefits to those
employees who were not involved geographically in the original
two strikes.

The Supreme Court reversed the holding:
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. . . There is no dispute that the economic
sanction of the A.F. of L. in this case was
directed against the entire employer association.
The strike was called for and on behalf of every
employee covered by the agreement. It therefore
involved all these claimants, at each particular
place of employment at which they were last employed .
id at 243 P.2d 959.
The fact that the selective strike "involved" the employers
not struck was a determining factor.
The same result occurred in Teamsters , etc. v. Orange
Transportation, etc.,

supra, when the union selectively

struck members of the employer bargaining unit which responded I
by effecting a general shutdown of all operations.

The

Court found this economic sanction was directed against the
entire employer group and the purpose of the selective
strike was to force acceptance of union demands.
In the Teamsters etc. v. Board of Review, supra, case
the claimant workers were allowed benefits but only upon a
finding that the work stoppage began with a strike by workers
who were not members of the claimants bargaining group.
As a result of these and other cases, the prevailing
law in Utah allows a worker benefits who becomes unemployed
because of a labor dispute if he was locked out by his
employer through no fault of his own.

However, no benefits

are allowed if the lockout was induced by a selective strike
which may be fairly considered as a strike againstall.
Even then, a worker can qualify for benefits if the work
stoppage is a strike that was compelled by the employers'
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bad faith bargaining.

In the Olof Nelson opinion, for

instance, the court discussed the California case of Bunny's
Waffle Shop v. California Employment Comm., 24 Cal. 2d 735,
151 P.2d 224, 227.

The employers there did not commence a

lockout but instead cut wages and imposed longer and split
shifts in response to a trade dispute.
by calling a general strike.

The employees responded

They were determined by the court

to be qualified for unemployment benefits since the work
stoppage was not truly voluntary on the worker's part.

The

Olof Nelson opinion, also quotes the case of McKinley v.
California Employment Stabilization Comm., 34 Cal. 2d 239, 209
P.2d 602, as follows:
. . . in reality, the form of the cessation of employment is not controlling and the determinative factor
is the volitional cause of the work stoppage. In
other words, although the employees left work of their
own choice, that choice was not freely made but was
compelled by the economic weapon which the employers
used. This is the only sound and fair way to apply
the subjective volitional test
id at 243 P.2d
957.
This "subjective volitional test" is not part of any statute
but was created by the California courts in the cases cited
above and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court for application
to our statute in the Olaf Nelson case.
The respondents utilized this volitional test in denying
the claimants benefits in this case.

There was no factual

finding of fault or actual cause of unemployment.

Thus an

assumption or presumption is permitted that has no rational
basis in fact.

The assumption or presumption inherent in the
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volitional test is that a party against whom any economic
action is directed has the absolute right to retaliate in
full economically by creating a complete work stoppage,
either by an employer's lockout or a union's strike.

This

assumption or presumption gives legal credence to the principhl
that "a strike against one is a strike against all. "

No

I

doubt this principle has merit in the context of collective
bargaining strategy.

However, this principle has no merit

I

in the context of determining eligibility for unemployment

compensation benefits.

The assumption applies regardless of

the degree of economic action the first party inflicts. The
assumption allows a party against whom any economic action
is directed to escalate the economic war, disturb the industira1
peace, destroy regular and adequate income for employees
without any fault, and interrupts the production of goods
and services.

Moreover, the direct cause of the cessation

of work, which causes unemployment, becomes irrelevant after
any party cotmnences any economic action. Under the volitional
test there can be only one culpable cause of cessation of
work.

In reality there may be several causes for cessation

of work at various places of employment, some disqualifying,
others not.

This is especially true in a multi-employer

bargaining unit involving numerous unions.
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-21Collective bargaining processes of today, which involves
general and selective strikes and lockouts, requires more
individualized treatment.
Employment

Turner v. Department of

Security, supra.

The volitional test is based

upon an assumption or presumption having no rational basis
in fact, and as such violates due process of law, Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 29

L.Ed.2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971);

Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L.Ed.
2d 551 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10
L.Ed. 2d 965, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963), and does not allow a
meaningful hearing.

Armstrong v. Manzo, supra.

A more

rational approach may be to shift the burden of proof to an
employer to justify any general lockout called in response
to a selective strike.
No fault should be attached to the employees who became
unemployed due to the general lockout in the present controversy.

They stood ready and willing to work and yet were

deprived of their work and public assistance.
The locked out employee stands in no different position
than an employee who is laid off.

They both are unemployed

because the employer ceased work through no fault of the
employee.

Yet the locked out employee is is denied benefits

provided the similarly situated worker solely because of his
membership in a union. This discrimination due to union
membership violates the employee's tightly guarded "Section
7 Rights" as guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. Section 157 of the
Wagner Act.
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In short, the disqualifying provision and the volitional
test fails to be reasonable,

is arbitrary, and rests upon

some ground of difference not having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation.

Reed v. Reed,

supra.
Second, the disqualifying section as applied by the
volitional test offends the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses by being totally insuseptable to definition or proof.
To begin with, the opinions which created this test provide
no guidelines to determine what the subjective intent of
a multi-employer association or a labor organization might
be.

Furthermore, from a practical point of view, how can an

individual worker who has the burden of proof, or even his
union, acquire competent evidence for the courts in Utah
of the events which transpired in the bargaining sessions in
Washington, D.C.

The sessions were not public and were con-

ducted by a few industry leaders.

Because of this lack of

definition and impossibility of proof, the disqualifying
provision imposes a burden that denies these claimants due
process of law by not providing any meaningful hearing.

Arm.st~

v. Manzo, supra.
Third, this also violates the public policy of the
State of Utah, i.e., promoting industrial peace, regular
and adequate income, and uninterrupted production of goods
and services.

In the present action, the I.B.T. was forced

to call a strike.

It called a selective strike for rather
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benign reasons.

Utah's disqualifying provision as applied

under the volitional test, which gives irrebutable sanctity
to the "strike against all" concept, encourages rather
than discourages industry-wide strikes.

CONCLUSION
Each of the employee applicants, especially those who
were locked out by their employers, should be eligible
for unemployment compensation benefits.

Utah's disqualification

statute 35-4-5(d) U.C.A. (1953), the volitional test
employed in this case operated to deprive the Petitioners'
rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
to the Utah and United States Constitutions.
The disqualifying provision as applied under the
volitional test denies benefits to employees out of work
through no fault of their own.

The Olof Nelson and Orange

Transportation cases provide automatic sanction to an employer
association's economic threat that "a strike against one is
a strike against all."

This strike against all reasoning

permits an employer to escalate a labor dispute, create a
stoppage of work, and unemployment without any fault on
behalf of the employee.

Yet, the employee is denied appro-

priate benefits.
A more rational and practical approach to the multiemployer bargaining situation has been adopted by the Courts,
For example in MEMCO v. Maryland Employment Security
Administration, 280 Md 536, 375 A.2d 1086 (1977), the Court
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of Appeals of Maryland considered the "strike against
all" concept in a multi-employer bargaining setting.

The

Court noted that the Maryland Statute disqualified claimants
only if the labor dispute existed at the plant or premises
where he was last employed.

In refusing to adopt the

"strike against all" concept, the Court held that the individua:
place of employment, not a multi-employer association, was
the relevant entity for purposes of determining whether a
labor dispute was the cause of the particular employee's
unemployment.

375 A.2d at 1092.

The language of Utah's

statute is very similar in this particular context.

This

approach would appear to alleviate the necessity of determining!
certain impossible issues such as who was justified in taking
economic action, subjective intent, and so forth in awarding
or denying benefits.

Respectfully Submitted:

LITTLEFIELD, COOK & PETERSON
426 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Petitioners
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K, Allen Zabel, Department of Employment Security, 1234
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